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NHS LIFT and the new shape of neoliberal welfare 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper discusses the NHS LIFT (Local Improvement Finance 
Trust) programme as an indicator of current trends in neoliberal welfare. LIFT, 
a new form of public-private partnership (PPP), offers an even more radical 
vision of service privatisation than the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  
Promoters Partnerships for Health claim that LIFT is “a true partnership in 
every sense of the word”; a senior manager at the organisation told me in an 
interview that where PFI had created adversarial relationships between public 
and private sectors, LIFT gives corporations a seat at the “planning table”. 
LIFT, like PPP more generally, forms part of the neoliberal welfare 
reconfigurations in the UK and elsewhere, creating new exclusions and new 
elites. Its birth and rapid growth are rooted in corporate power and the state-
supported development and consolidation of new markets. When the UK 
National Health Service was created in 1948, elite consultants were seen as 
the major countervailing power, and generously compensated for the 
encroachment upon their business. Now, multinational companies - 
pharmaceutical firms, insurers, private medical providers, construction and 
service companies - tower over increasingly embattled publicly run health 
services and the clinicians operating within or even outside them. LIFT is a 
key organisational form allowing these companies unprecedented access to 
public service provision, and theorising LIFT helps us understand the 
changing face of neo-liberal welfare in more general terms. 
This article discusses five major issues surrounding neo-liberal welfare 
as exemplified in the shift to LIFT-type models. These are: 
 
1. The development of new elite networks and identities. This is important 
in allowing a shift away from a traditional ideology of civil service 
neutrality, and towards a discourse that celebrates “double-hatting”. 
The new discourse of leadership justifies a revolving door culture that 
no longer attempts to clearly demarcate representatives of the state 
and of capital. 
 
2. Conflicts of interest between large and small capital (including GPs). 
LIFT represents a corporatisation of welfare, rather than simply a shift 
from the formally public sector to the formally private sector. GPs with 
their (however problematic) embeddedness within local health systems 
are replaced by multinational corporations organised into consortia. 
This creates proletarianising pressures upon clinicians. 
 
3. The multiple meanings of “privatisation” (and the related terms 
commodification and marketisation). LIFT must be defined as 
representing both commodification and privatisation; however, LIFT 
companies led by large banks replace rather than create competitive 
markets. Public services are  being remade in the image of – and 
interests of – financial institutions. 
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4. The status and meaning of “flexibility”, innovation, and risk-taking within 
these new power complexes. Service privatisation is often justified by 
equating private companies with these neoliberal virtues. However, 
LIFT’s model blocks local initiative and entrepreneurship, imposing 
instead a remote, bureaucratic, and inflexible outsourcing. 
 
5. The changing but still troubled relationship between capitalist 
accumulation and the legitimation of the capitalist system. LIFT’s 
ineffective structures create renewed legitimation problems, and the 
system cannot easily be steered. Research into LIFT found high levels 
of private discontent among local NHS management. 
 
The article concludes by linking these themes and by considering 
implications for activists challenging neo-liberal welfare. Additional themes not 
considered here include the topic of surveillance and welfare as punitive, as 
yet less prominent within LIFT but of deserved interest to critical analysts. 
 
2. The road to neoliberal welfare 
 
2.1 Theories of the welfare state 
 
What are the likely repercussions of a shift to neo-liberal forms of 
welfare? This section reviews some salient critical literature to discuss neo-
liberal claims, aims, and practices. It builds on influential Marxist analysis of 
the welfare state (e.g. O’Connor 1976, Gough 1979, Offe 1984). While some 
of these models can be over-functionalist, they usefully move beyond a focus 
on the cost of welfare and examine why money is being spent and where it is 
going. This is particularly important for NHS “reform”, where the government 
claims that increased spending means any problems are the responsibility of 
inefficient public sector managers, greedy staff, or irresponsible service users. 
O’Connor identified two sometimes conflicting objectives for welfare 
policy: establishing favourable conditions for capital accumulation and 
ensuring popular legitimation for the capitalist system. Under the first category 
would come projects and services that increase labour productivity or lower 
the social costs of reproduction. These functions are “indirectly productive” for 
capital (Gough 1979), providing goods and services that while not directly 
profitable allow private firms an increased rate of profit. The second category, 
‘social expenses’ (or social control) is not productive for capital but helps to 
ideologically enrol workers into the system. The NHS, with its longstanding 
public support and traditional focus on curative medicine (primarily servicing 
the workforce, while those seen as non-productive received ‘Cinderella 
services’), can be seen to fulfil both. But settlements depend on struggle and 
are unstable. Even the first objective can have a tenuous existence: in the 
short run firms want lower taxes, but long-term competitiveness may depend 
on state services (Pfaller, Gough, and Therborn 1991). 
State support for accumulation is direct as well as indirect, and this 
duality is increasingly salient – and problematic. As well as indirectly 
improving conditions for capitalist accumulation generally (providing road 
infrastructure, publicly organised education, etc.), traditional public 
procurement directly provided profits for individual firms. Even within UK 
 3
welfare state provision at its most “public”, many goods were provided by 
private companies (e.g. buildings, pharmaceuticals, roads, etc.) while related 
services were often provided publicly: this division is perhaps clearest for the 
NHS. As the post-war British economy was based on manufacturing, private 
service provision was then relatively small and weak. Public provision in these 
areas was not experienced as a major threat to capitalist interests. However, 
current developments in welfare encourage the extension of direct 
accumulation, as the service sector grows and its firms demand a share of 
public sector expenditure – the state as client rather than as competitor. 
 
2.2 From Keynesianism to neoliberal welfare 
 
This pressure from the private sector has been part of a growing 
challenge to the welfare state since the end of the long boom (Ferguson et al 
2002). Its legitimacy has been undermined by attacks from the right and the 
left, from critiques by user-led movements to the re-conceptualisation of public 
sector employees as ‘knaves’, not ‘knights’ (Le Grand 2003). Meanwhile, the 
welfare state has come under attack for hampering accumulation, rather than 
supporting it. Thatcher spoke of a dependency culture created by welfare 
benefits; New Labour valorises “entrepreneurialism” and portrays public 
sector staff as inefficient and unproductive. From the late 1970s onwards, 
writers of very different persuasions in the UK and other countries have 
concurred that the welfare state is in crisis. 
For neo-liberals, welfare privatisation promises to solve problems of 
accumulation and legitimation. Breaking the power of the trade unions 
enabled – and was enabled by – the establishment of neo-liberal welfare. 
Outsourcing contributed to the decline in union membership in 1980s Britain, 
as a public sector culture that tolerated unionism was replaced by a private 
sector culture that saw it as blocking higher profits. The public sector itself 
changed, as the threat of outsourcing often secured concessions from labour 
(Whitfield 2001). Another way of breaking the welfare deadlock on terms 
favourable to capital was encouraging service users to see themselves as 
customers, atomising and individualising them (McGregor 2002) – although 
O’Connor (1986) points out that consumerism can be a source of 
(contradictory) resistance. 
 Justified by market rhetoric, the practice of neo-liberal welfare centrally 
involves the financialisation of service provision (Cutler 2001). Whether or not 
actual markets are created, or provision is shifted to a private sector provider, 
goods, services, staff, and service users are reconceptualised within a 
commodified discourse. For example, references to a “local health economy” 
may replace references to the NHS or public sector in documents about 
primary care provision (Aldred 2007). Leys (2003) outlines four conditions for 
financialisation: firstly, goods or services must be commodifiable (i.e. 
constructed as quantifiable and exchangeable); secondly, the public must be 
persuaded to want these as commodities; thirdly, the labour force must be 
transformed, and finally the state must absorb risk through direct subsidies. 
Thus neo-liberal welfare produces distinct strategies to aid accumulation 
(through further attacks on labour, state support for firms, and instituting or 
increasing individual charges for services or goods) and legitimation (justifying 
the changes by presenting commodified services as natural, such as 
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downgrading clinician-patient relationships and conceptualising primary health 
care as a series of discrete, countable, anonymous interventions). 
Many critics (e.g. Pollock 2004, Edwards and Shaoul 2003) have 
argued convincingly that neo-liberal welfare should be seen as generating 
externalities, transferring rather than cutting costs. When companies attack 
trade unions, they take money from individual employees and from the public 
purse; for example, moving workers onto part-time shifts results in a lowered 
tax take and leaves employees dependent on means-tested benefits. While 
neo-liberals claim that privatisation creates or adds value, it has actually 
redistributed income from individuals and from the state (and sometimes from 
other capitalists) towards favoured firms. In the short term, although this has 
failed to remedy low growth rates, it has helped capital to increase its share of 
national income. 
The UK government has embraced an overt shift in its role from 
arbitrating between companies to representing particular business interests as 
the national interest (Flynn 2000).  Yet this aggravates a tension between 
welfare as directly productive, and as indirectly productive. While the former 
has always been a component of the welfare state, neo-liberal policies 
produce a dual privatisation movement (Ellison 2006), prioritising direct profit-
making and shifting the costs associated with social reproduction onto 
individuals or their employers. This can cause conflicts between firms directly 
benefiting from welfare contracts, and firms feeling the effects of service 
withdrawal. For example, PFI deals often move hospitals and health centres 
out of town to greenfield sites, which are more difficult to access and may 
result in workers needing to take more time off for medical visits. 
Moreover, this new accumulation regime may generate legitimation 
crises if it is perceived as benefiting a group of firms at the expense of 
individuals or the “nation”. One potential resolution might be the creation of 
new “company towns”, where businesses embed themselves in their local 
area and produce localised services (Harvey 2001): this model seems to have 
informed the thinking behind LIFT (see below). Another response has been 
the development of complex models of privatisation and the promotion of 
welfare reform as generating “plurality” rather than “privatisation”, 
“partnership” rather than “profit” (Ling 2000). Additional legitimation claims are 
based around the argument that privatisation enables innovation, flexibility, 
and risk-taking. In PFI-based privatisation models it is the “risk transfer” 
element that justifies their use, enabling initially more expensive schemes to 
appear cheaper. 
 
2.3 The PFI model: design, build, finance, and operate 
 
Excepting Wales1, PFI is practically the route for public procurement of 
UK hospitals (and many other new buildings); its descendent LIFT is 
becoming the dominant method for new primary care developments in 
England. But PFI’s beginnings were unpromising. The then Conservative 
government created PFI in 1992, while Labour opposed it. Progress was slow 
and when Labour was elected in 1997 only a handful of projects were 
proceeding (Whitfield 2001). However, perhaps to signify its business-friendly 
credentials, the new government swiftly transformed PFI into the procurement 
route of choice for public sector capital projects. 
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PFI’s novelty rests on its bundling of design, construction, and 
operational services within one long-term contract, financed by private 
borrowing repaid yearly over decades through a unitary service charge. At the 
end of the contract buildings will usually revert to the public sector, a 
concession to critics. Traditionally, public sector capital projects were built and 
designed by the private sector, and increasingly ‘support services’ are run by 
the private sector. However, PFI’s impact is not merely due to the addition of 
private finance. It is creating a consolidated industry in which large private 
firms (financiers, construction companies, and service providers) collaborate 
in consortia, creating complex state-supported oligopolies (Pollock 2004). 
These firms are gaining long-term control over the ownership of ‘public’ 
buildings (through share sales and debt transfer) and how these buildings are 
managed and run (through the award of sub-contracts). Instead of paying a 
one-off cost for an asset, the public sector enters into a long-term service 
contract, giving the asset owners a long-term government-backed cashflow. 
This is proving popular with pension funds and private equity vehicles 
specialising in the secondary market: once the asset has been built, the 
contract becomes extremely low risk. Over the remaining years of the contact, 
the owner may refinance bank debt, cut costs on maintenance and support 
services, and/or persuade the public sector to pay more than the originally 
agreed annual charge. None of these strategies is possible in traditional 
public procurement, or through short-term contracting for individual services. 
PFI is complex, and public sector managers must accept responsibility 
for problems, while often lacking knowledge of the legal complexities. Special 
Purpose Vehicles (limited liability PFI consortia) are typically composed of a 
construction company, financial institutions, and a facilities maintenance 
company. The SPV contracts with the public body, sub-contracting work to 
other companies, often sister companies to consortium members. Open 
competition is limited to the involvement of usually around three (but 
sometimes fewer) consortia that submit bids at the start of the tendering 
process. Contestability is low, given the complex and networked relationships 
between a relatively small number of companies, which now comprise the 
market for public procurement. As far as the public body is concerned, any 
such competition or contestability would generally only occur at the beginning 
of the contract; if extra work arises relating to the assets it must usually be 
offered to the existing contractor. 
PFI represents a political compromise, as initially the NHS’s popularity 
prevented the privatisation of jobs such as nursing and doctoring. Thus PFI 
contracts exclude ‘core’ staff, who remain in the public sector. Definitions of 
‘core’ and ‘support’ are flexible: in the NHS ‘support workers’ can include 
some clinical services, such as pathology. Generally, the ‘core’ has meant the 
most powerful professional group(s): teachers in PFI schools and doctors and 
nurses in PFI hospitals, as well as managers and administrative staff 
supporting them. As critics have charged, this has led to the degradation of 
‘support services’ such as school meals provision, which are no longer seen 
as essential and can be ‘sweated’ alongside the rest of the PFI contract, in the 
industry’s words (Halligan 2006).2 However, the core/periphery distinction is 
unstable, and ‘core’ services are increasingly targeted. 
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2.4 LIFT: “Partnership” beyond PFI 
 
NHS Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) covers half of all English 
NHS Primary Care Trusts (PCTs)3. It is a development of the PFI model for 
primary care premises, and has already spawned a related model in the 
education sector, Building Schools for the Future. LIFT will mean that GP 
surgeries and health centres will shift from being largely owned by GPs and 
the NHS to corporate ownership: currently, three in five surgeries are owned 
by individual GPs, and one in five by the NHS. Like PFI, LIFT involves the 
private sector letting buildings and attached services to the public sector. LIFT 
is complex and its structure can only be sketched out here: for more 
information, please see my report for UNISON (2006). 
Each of fifty-one LIFT localities will have a 20-year Strategic Partnering 
Agreement between a group of local NHS Trusts and a consortium known as 
a LIFT company (LIFTCo). The agreement includes an “exclusivity clause”, 
meaning that over the life of the agreement a local LIFTCo will have sole 
rights to develop any new primary care premises in its area. It will then lease 
out the buildings over 25 years to service providers, while providing some 
support services as per the PFI model. Importantly, while PFI involves a 
project company managing a project, LIFT will include “buildings we haven’t 
even thought of yet”, as one interviewee commented. A public sector 
representative sits on each LIFTCo board, and private sector personnel join 
with public sector managers on the Strategic Partnering Boards set up to plan 
local primary healthcare provision. 
LIFT mandates a “public sector shareholding” which means that local 
NHS Trusts purchase a 20% stake in “their” LIFTCo. Another 20% belongs to 
the national agency Partnerships UK (until recently itself also a PPP) and the 
remaining 60% to the institutional investors. These generally comprise a 
financial institution, a support services company, and a construction company. 
Thus LIFT represents a substantial change in the provision of primary care 
accommodation, albeit one that will take place gradually. For example, 
primary care trust maintenance departments are likely to transfer over time to 
the support services company involved, but this will not happen with the 
signing of the initial contract. Similarly clinical, other support services, and 
even local authority-run services might transfer in the future, and trusts are 
encouraged to consider transferring existing buildings into the LIFT portfolio. 
Data used here derive from research into LIFT at national and local 
levels. Following effective quantitative critiques of PFI (e.g. Pollock 1994), 
justification of welfare reform policies shifted onto a qualitative level. The 
National Audit Office’s report on LIFT (2005) eschewed calculating public 
sector comparators for talk of qualitative benefits of working in “partnership”. I 
decided to use critical ethnographic research to understand and analyse 
these claimed cultural changes. The approach drew on Marcus’s (1999) 
concept of the multi-site case study, in which detailed investigation may follow 
an object, rather than a group of people. For LIFT, this is appropriate, as each 
policy object creates relationships between people in numerous organisations, 
public and private, and complex financial transactions. 
On beginning the investigation, most LIFT schemes were at an early 
stage, and the case study research focused upon one relatively advanced 
LIFT area (here this is referred to as “Wellston”). A range of strategies were 
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employed to increase validity. Firstly, I viewed the research as an embedded 
case study (Yin 2003), with inter-case comparisons between organisations in 
Wellston. I collected and analysed national level data to gain understanding of 
the programme as a whole. Secondly, I conducted more limited investigations 
into three “comparator areas”: one had been suggested as a “positive 
example” of success, one as a “negative example” of failure, and the third 
contained a prominent insider critic of LIFT.  
In addition, triangulation was used at a methods level. The research 
involved over thirty observations of local and national meetings and events 
and a similar number of interviews with informants, from senior managers at 
Partnerships for Health (PfH), the agency leading the national programme to 
clinicians, local private sector personnel, and middle-level managers from 
Wellston’s four NHS Trusts. Relevant documents were analysed for content 
and discursive patterns, and LIFT’s local and national structures were studied. 
These strategies allowed me to be reasonably confident about the value of 
the patterns that I was identifying from my data. Moreover, the value of the 
data reaches beyond the particular policy area: I argue that the LIFT model 
represents a new stage in the neoliberal restructuring of welfare4. 
 
3. Theorising LIFT 
 
3.1 The new elites: bridging the public and private sectors 
 
LIFT has enabled and reinforced new elite networks, dominated by 
senior public and private sector executive managers. These dominated the 
national LIFT forums that I attended. Relatively few non-executive NHS Trust 
directors or clinicians attended, and even fewer patient representatives. Such 
structures bypass traditional ‘clinical governance’ that incorporates a layer of 
GPs and other professionals, instead involving representatives of large private 
corporations. The perceived independence of clinical judgement is under 
threat from this public-private elite. LIFT further sidelines traditionally 
marginalised patient organisations; in my main case study area these were 
unaware of its existence, and they did not attend the high-level Strategic 
Partnering Board meetings. 
The new public-private elites are marginalising old conceptions of 
public sector duty and independence, replacing civil servants with “double-
hatters” whose conflicts of interest are no longer regarded as embarrassing 
but as a source of pride (Aldred 2007a). Ironically, this is happening when 
WTO and EU market regulations are being brought in stressing “non-
discrimination” between service providers. However, PPP models effectively 
outsource commissioning to private sector organisations, absolving those 
commissioning public services of the responsibility to follow public sector 
commissioning regulations (and other public sector regulations relating to 
Freedom of Information, etc.). 
An infrastructure has developed to support the “PPP/PFI community”, 
with private meetings and conferences where senior public and private sector 
managers come together nationally and locally. This provides a practical basis 
for state elites to see the national interest as essentially identical to the 
PPP/PFI industry’s interests. For example, UK Auditor-General Sir John 
Bourn told the industry’s PPP Forum in 2003: 
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[W]e’ll [i.e., the NAO] make our contribution to your success, and your 
success is the success of the community at large.  
 
and 
 
[T]he National Audit Office will be with you all, public sector and private 
sector, in making further success into this century of PFI and PPP. 
 
Bourn argued that the role of the auditor has shifted: s/he should no longer 
evaluate whether policies meet stated government objectives. Instead, the 
auditor’s “independence” lies in the ability to objectively improve and refine 
programmes, rather than assessing them. One should not expect the NAO to 
state that LIFT may conflict with government objectives to provide greater 
choice for patients, for example. Instead it will make recommendations to 
ensure that policies are “an even greater success”. 
Characteristically, the design, promotion, and management of LIFT as 
a national policy were entrusted not to the state itself, but to a part-privatised 
quango, Partnerships for Health5. The Chief Executives of Partnerships for 
Health and its then parent body Partnerships UK were exemplary double-
hatters. One, a chartered engineer, comes from a construction industry and 
PFI background. The other was a senior financier working for multinational 
institutions on PPP projects in the UK. Part of their significance is the way that 
they have brought together major finance and construction firms, with the 
active support of government. 
Like these two senior executives, many key players have little or no 
health sector experience, although others have worked in the NHS and/or the 
private health care industry. While PfH displays a private-sector orientation 
and promotes the benefits of ‘co-operative working’ and ‘partnership’ with the 
private sector, it is located within the Department of Health building. It could 
thus be seen to symbolise contemporary UK welfare governance: the state as 
not so much lean, but constructing complex quasi-private layers within itself. 
New bureaucratic layers may create obstacles and inefficiencies, but they can 
act to exclude outsiders, bind insiders together, and obstruct the scrutiny of 
government. 
As Leys (2006) argues, elite networks have become both broader and 
narrower: narrowing the gap between “public” and “private”, including more 
multinational players, but excluding professionals and lower-level elected 
representatives. Under LIFT, ‘partnership’ with private corporations replaces 
‘partnership’ with GPs. In an earlier piece (Aldred 2007a), I argue that this 
creates “closed policy networks and broken chains of communication”. Actors 
such as GPs and service users are excluded, rather than being co-opted as 
(respectively) businesspeople and consumers. The multiple identities (and 
financial interests) promoted by the double-hatters are, like large public 
procurement projects, effectively limited to the elite. Their rejection of 
professional knowledges for private sector mystique is epitomised in this 
comment by a financier working on Wellston LIFT: 
 
I’m not sure what I have a background in really. I’ve been doing this job, 
obviously, I spend a lot of time with health people. Do I have a formal, 
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professional qualification in medicine and all that kind of stuff – absolutely no 
way, none whatsoever. I mean, my father was a GP (laughs) but that’s got 
nothing at all to do with it. 
 
3.2 Centralising capital and proletarianising professionals 
   
Over the past twenty years of NHS reform the medical profession has 
been under increasing pressure, from the Griffiths report (recommending the 
introduction of general management) to the recent withdrawal of professional 
self-regulation. In primary care, most doctors are both professionals and petty 
capitalists, paid from the profits of their practice; this fitted within a broader 
structure that saw most GPs organised as “independent contractors” selling 
their services to the NHS. This stabilised the system for some time at the cost 
of long-term underinvestment (Pollock 2004); however the end of this period 
was heralded by the new GP contract. The contract seemed like an excellent 
deal for practitioners, offering a large pay rise and an end to responsibility for 
out-of-hours care. The double-edged sword is that GPs are losing the 
traditional basis for their particular professional status; the provision of 
personal, one-to-one care, day or night (Berger and Mohr 1967).  
Trends towards larger primary care centres, including some run by 
private companies employing salaried GPs, will reduce GPs’ historically high 
levels of autonomy. New contracts prioritise meeting targets and an 
increasing proportion of practice incomes now come from these payments, 
which use financial incentives to direct GP activity rather than the more 
traditional capitation income. LIFT itself is part of a trend towards greater 
managerial control over GP labour by removing practice ownership from GPs. 
Like out-of-hours care, the latter has often been experienced as a burden by 
GPs, yet it provided them with a modality of control over their labour not 
available to other professionals.  
In almost all LIFT areas, “private sector partners” are national or 
multinational corporations. In Wellston the banks had refused to engage one 
of the smaller building companies already known to the local NHS, and so a 
national company had been chosen. The opening up of GP services to large 
companies demonstrates the interests behind “the plurality agenda”, and the 
limits of market discourse. If the government merely favoured private 
ownership per se, the existing patchwork of small GP surgeries would surely 
seem ideal. Perhaps it would merely abolish catchment areas and so free up 
the market in GP services. However, the interests of large firms and 
particularly those within the PFI/PPP industry are the key to neo-liberal 
welfare reform. PFI and LIFT are both resulting in services being centralised 
and co-located, often in out-of-town sites. Whether this is more “accessible” is 
debatable, particularly for people without private transport. However, it suits 
large companies who do not want to deal with what a LIFTCo manager 
described to me as “itty-bitty contracts”. 
Part of the justification for the new arrangements is a claim that 
previously the NHS was monolithic, and a “diversity of providers” will break 
down such bureaucratic “silos”. Academic commentators have accepted some 
of this conventional wisdom. The otherwise balanced literature review by 
Ferlie and McGovern (2003) characterises NHS governance as traditionally 
“bureaucratic”, despite the historic structure of general practitioner service 
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provision. This small business/professional model had drawbacks, but hardly 
represented classic bureaucracy. LIFT demonstrates the inadequacy of 
equating a “pre-reform” NHS with monolithic bureaucracy; as GPs interviewed 
pointed out, LIFT is arguably more top-down and bureaucratic than the often 
rather fragmented system that it is replacing (see further 3.4 below). One 
might suspect that GPs are losing out because while formally “private”, they 
are not corporate, generally working within a small business model governed 
by professional ideology or individual gain but not share price. 
As befits an era where supermarket heads advise governments on 
health services, the LIFT surgery of the future is what the Department of 
Health calls a one-stop shop (a supermarketised concept, like the rebranding 
of libraries as “Idea Stores”). It will have around ten GPs and a range of 
“income-generating” services, from leisure centres to social services to retail 
units. This turns GPs into one of many service providers within a building they 
do not own or control.6 While the marginalisation of staff and service users 
initially enables contracts to move forward relatively speedily, it creates 
longer-term problems and instabilities. In Wellston, most GPs were sceptical 
or oppositional. The one GP who had initially spoken out in favour of LIFT 
admitted to disillusionment. Instead of letting GPs act entrepreneurially and 
reap financial and status rewards, financialisation privileged the position and 
expertise held by financiers and managers: 
 
Most of LIFT is quite high level finance discussion. That was done by the 
estates department, or people that they’d got in to do that. Way beyond my 
understanding. 
 
 While public sector professionals are officially urged to become 
“entrepreneurial”, the corporatisation of welfare discourages this. LIFT marks 
a shift away from GP owner-occupation towards tenancy; GPs are becoming 
more like employees rather than businesspeople. An initial plan to offer GPs 
shares in LIFT companies has not materialised; GPs in Wellston complained 
that LIFT company ownership of premises made it expensive and difficult for 
them to change and develop their services. Any building alterations, however, 
minor, had to go through the LIFT process, whereas previously GPs would 
have been able to obtain competing quotes from three local companies. GPs 
argued that this stifled their autonomy and control over service provision. 
 
The problem is that things change all the time. A viable, thinking practice is 
going to keep changing. They have to have the fluidity to change quickly. 
 
(GP representative) 
 
 Here, despite the claims to “entrepreneurialism” often made in pro-
privatisation discourse, large corporations are replacing GPs, who after all are 
also small business people and thus more easily cast as entrepreneurs than 
big bureaucracies. The state is playing a key role in organising the 
centralisation of capital; under the aegis of successive Labour administrations 
it has created a “PPP industry” made up of major firms acting together in 
consortia. One aim of creating this industry is to increase managerial control 
over GPs, and this goal was clearly recognised by interviewees (Aldred 2007). 
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While GPs are unlikely to become fully proletarianised, the changes in their 
labour process means that they are becoming more like other professional 
employees, losing the clinical autonomy and control over premises that long 
set them apart from other professionals such as teachers. 
  
3.3 Commodification: but where is the ‘market’ and the ‘competition’? 
 
Definitions of privatisation practices are contested. Depending on the 
audience, Britain’s New Labour government still sometimes wants to claim 
that it is not privatising; with LIFT, it uses the fact that many GP surgeries are 
already in private hands. But firstly, in practice LIFT is privatising NHS 
facilities: in the areas that I studied, initial schemes transfer NHS sites to 
private ownership. Secondly, the private/public divide is not purely legal, but 
should be understood socially and historically, involving formal or informal 
rights. In eighteenth century England, employers fought to ensure that ‘their’ 
cloth was seen as theirs and not something over which textile workers had 
customary rights (Linebaugh 2006). Traditional GP ownership may legally be 
“private”, but covenants often ensure that buildings can only be used for NHS 
services. Tied to the NHS through long-term partnerships, GPs (and their 
patients) see themselves as part of the NHS (Tudor Hart 2006). A shift to 
corporate ownership disembeds surgery ownership from its historical location, 
which has anchored it closely to the ‘public’ and the ‘public sector’. 
In addition, the concept of privatisation should be used more broadly 
than just to describe a formal shift in ownership from the public to the private 
sector (c.f. Harvey 2003). The contractualisation of relationships between 
different organisational units within a range of public services, from the BBC 
to the NHS, helps to turn the services exchanged into commodities even if 
they are not sold on the open market. Privatised ways of operating become 
embedded within these organisations (Born 2005); organisational identities 
become ‘privatised’ – modelled on those existing (or thought to exist) in 
private firms. A “public sector director” sits on LIFT boards and is responsible 
to the public sector organisations in their capacity as shareholders in LIFT. 
S/he must prioritise the financial health of the LIFT company even if it conflicts 
with health care needs. This role is only public if public sector organisations 
are seen as corporations that happen to have a state shareholding. 
Does the LIFT model also represent the commodification of welfare? I 
would argue that it does, albeit not directly. With GPs as independent 
contractors, and practices individually responsible for their own premises, the 
commodification of surgeries was limited. This certainly had drawbacks; many 
GPs failed to invest in their premises or to upgrade and modernise them 
(Tudor Hart 2006). However, neither did they try to maximise revenue from 
premises by opening them up to other ‘income streams’. Shifting premises 
ownership to large financial institutions is likely to do exactly this, and in 
Wellston I witnessed attempts to find such additional revenue generating 
opportunities. The more successful LIFT schemes seem to be doing this with 
greater efficiency and ruthlessness, allocating space in advance and securing 
long-term rental commitments (e.g. from supermarkets). Of course, while this 
may benefit the LIFT companies involved, it may not benefit the local NHS 
Trusts7 or the local population. 
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While I would describe LIFT as representing privatisation and 
commodification for reasons outlined above, it is not in any simple sense a 
“market solution”. It absorbs large amounts of public resources from the NHS 
locally and nationally, in terms of staff time, additional monetary costs, and so 
on. Market elements are also limited by the ‘exclusivity clause’ which has 
already prevented GPs raising finance privately (Crump 2006). PPP 
represents a shift from short-term to long-term contracting, and it is the former 
that represents a purer market relationship between parties (Flynn 1994). 
Indeed, corporations do not necessarily want “more market” applied to 
themselves, although market rhetoric often forms part of the ideological 
justification for privatisation. Private health companies successfully lobbied 
the government to ensure that they were granted higher tariff rates than the 
NHS and block contracts regardless of the volume of actual operations carried 
out (UNISON 2005), neither of which suggests a commitment to the rigours of 
market competition. 
By contrast, LIFT does encourage competition between public sector 
bodies. Usually a LIFT company is tied to several NHS primary care trusts, 
each struggling to make their own projects attractive to the LIFT company. 
Under PPP, corporations benefit from long-term contracts, while the public 
sector experiences insecurity and competition. Given this clash with the 
“market” rhetoric justifying the process, no wonder many public sector 
interviewees claimed that they were the true “entrepreneurial innovators”. 
PPP represents monopoly for the PPP industry and markets only for those 
less privileged. 
David Harvey (2005) argues that neoliberalism does not attempt to 
impose a market utopia, but is instead about the restoration of class power. Of 
course, the capitalist class is not homogenous and, as I have suggested, 
small capital is losing out under PPP. Financial capital is dominant under LIFT 
structures, with banks ultimately making decisions on whether schemes 
proceed. While construction and services companies benefit from the 
scheme, they are not in charge of it to the same extent.  
 
 
3.4 Stifling innovation and risk-taking: the virtual bureaucracy 
 
Data portraying PPPs in practice injects caution into claims that 
privatisation releases innovation and flexibility stifled by public sector 
bureaucracies. This argument has become accepted wisdom in elite policy 
circles. In 2001 (when plans for LIFT were being finalised) a Department of 
Health official told the Daily Telegraph that then health minister and Blairite 
Alan Milburn “wants to get rid of the NHS monolith which suppresses 
enterprise and innovation within the NHS” (Cracknell 2001). Former Chief 
Executive of Partnerships for Health David Goldstone told the Contract 
Journal (2003) that LIFT the model was “a hybrid that took the best from 
traditional PFIs and PPPs and the existing primary care model”. LIFT was 
“something that would be responsive to the changing clinical requirements 
and needs... LIFT allows this flexibility because of the level of partnership 
between the public and private sector.” 
In the case study the key local representative of this ideology was a 
financier. He argued that corporate involvement in primary health care 
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provision would bring “enthusiasm” and “drive” that could break down old 
bureaucratic boundaries, complaining that “most people in the public sector, 
the way they do it, they’re used to separate organisations, aren’t they?... And 
all of those organisations tend to act in a very independent way, which 
actually is a bit mad.” Similarly, a National Audit Office auditor explained the 
logic behind their positive report on LIFT. He said that private sector investors 
believed LIFT moved on from PFI in allowing the private sector more freedom 
to create “a much more flexible business model”. 
Yet private sector practices developed to manage customer demand, 
control labour, and rationalise production can hamper speed and innovation. 
In Wellston, a call centre based outside the region was replacing dedicated, 
on-site maintenance staff. To access the repairs service, a member of staff 
now had to contact the building manager, who would contact the call centre, 
which would contact an engineer. A process involving one step (contacting a 
PCT maintenance engineer) had been replaced by three steps. This more 
complex procedure may deter staff from calling on the maintenance service, 
and creates opportunities for requests to become lost in the system. 
More specifically, by giving a private contractor long-term monopoly 
pricing power, LIFT creates substantial blocks to flexibility of service provision, 
(UNISON 2006). As GPs commented, the monopoly stops staff from 
developing and realising new ideas. Only a LIFT company can sanction and 
arrange even minor alterations, so Wellston GPs in LIFT buildings were not 
allowed to pin up patient artwork. They had to call in the LIFT company (which 
would delegate to its subcontractors) to put up noticeboards or install sockets, 
jobs that might previously have been done for free by clinicians with DIY skills 
or that could have been offered to local craftspeople. Not only is this likely to 
be expensive (as a LIFT GP testified to the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Public Accounts), the process obstructs staff who have ideas 
for changes or improvements. 
Moreover, the financial criteria used to plan additional services results 
in new ideas falling by the wayside. In LIFT buildings non-NHS areas are 
rented separately by the LIFT company as income-generating “retail units”. 
Wellston’s NHS managers had wanted a “community café” within their first 
LIFT centre, influenced by the groundbreaking success of a local healthy 
living centre. However, in accordance with LIFT’s prioritisation of profitability, 
the LIFT company had tendered the space commercially. Due to the high 
rents sought, the space proved unviable for commercial and non-profit café 
operators, so it remained empty while public and private sector managers 
tried (fruitlessly, during the fieldwork period) to find an acceptable 
compromise. This is an instance of a contradiction that I analyse elsewhere in 
more detail (Aldred 2007b): privatised structures fail to enable the privatised 
(e.g. “social entrepreneurial”) subjectivities that might embed them in self-
supporting local social networks (c.f. Polanyi 2002). 
Indeed, LIFT rents have marginalised the place of community and 
voluntary sector organisations within the new buildings, despite rhetoric about 
community involvement and “community ownership”. Such organisations 
cannot survive if treated as “income generators”. Rather than producing 
networks and synergies, LIFT disembeds organisations from existing 
networks, and risks leaving privatised “local health economies” adrift in a sea 
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of commodified relationships. A shareholding logic relentlessly financialises 
services, downgrading outcomes that cannot be costed and charged.  
This has led to small pharmacies losing out, this criticism even 
surfacing in the overwhelmingly positive National Audit Office (2005) report on 
LIFT. Documentation surrounding LIFT refers to “chain pharmacies” and there 
are no guidelines to ensure the retention of community pharmacies in new 
buildings (Aldred 2007). Wellston’s first LIFT building contains a community 
pharmacy, but only as a temporary concession after extended wrangling. 
Wellston’s local pharmacy representative criticised corporate pharmacies for 
only being concerned with profit: 
 
They see their money. They’re vertically integrated. They pay less for the 
drugs which they’re dispensing, they can get a big discount. So they’re making 
more profit. And that’s really what they want to be doing. 
 
Initially, LIFT companies were supposed to lease space directly to GPs 
on a short to medium term basis, allowing the NHS to benefit from “more 
flexible” relationships with professionals (PWC 2001). However, the private 
sector backed away from the risk of units remaining unlet, and so now LIFT 
companies lease to NHS organisations for 25 years, which then sub-let to 
GPs. This shields the private sector from risk, but exposes the NHS and 
creates additional contractual layers. Even financial flexibility seems limited; 
the financiers involved in the scheme have not created the variety of financing 
options originally envisaged by Partnerships for Health. Instead, the original 
PFI-based model remains the only choice. 
The LIFT structure can be characterised as creating “virtual 
bureaucracies” (such as shell sub-companies and boards that rarely meet), 
rigid, and risk-averse (Aldred 2007). The shift from GP to LIFTCo ownership 
of premises is a shift from rooted to placeless capital, as well as a shift from 
small to large capital (see section 3.2 above). LIFTCo structures have been 
designed so that shares, and other financial instruments, can be sold on 
secondary markets through a plethora of holding companies (FundCos, which 
own individual centres). 
In Wellston and in national LIFT forums, interviewees spoke of LIFTCo 
as “virtual” or “shell”, and its associated Strategic Partnering Board  structures 
as “not really existing”. Wellstone’s local public sector managers found they 
had to act for LIFTCo, which seemed financially but not socially “real”. In two 
comparator areas, NHS managers agreed that they had had to largely control 
the LIFT process themselves; it had not become self-sustaining. Only in the 
other area, where open resistance had emerged, did the LIFT company seem 
to exist independently. In opposing it protestors had helped to construct 
something tangible that could be opposed. By contrast, in other areas there 
was little organised opposition and LIFTCo remained nebulous. One Wellston 
GP said frustratedly, “I just don’t know who they are”. But this failure 
paradoxically helped LIFT: it seemed hard to oppose something so slippery. 
 
3.5 Problems of effectiveness and legitimacy 
  
In Wellston, it soon became apparent that LIFT was not working 
smoothly; in two of the three boroughs involved, it had reached the level of a 
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crisis of effectiveness. This produced an internal crisis of legitimacy among 
local NHS managers who, in general, did not seem ideologically opposed to 
NHS privatisation. Most had become disillusioned at LIFT’s failure to live up to 
the extravagant promises of pro-privatisation discourses. However, they 
contained their frustrations within the local NHS and the walls of board 
meetings. While problems remained unspoken in public forums, an impasse 
had been reached; most of Wellston’s NHS had few concrete achievements to 
show for its money, several years into the local LIFT programme. 
This was not how it was meant to be. LIFT’s planners seemed 
genuinely to believe that radically deepening private sector control over 
welfare would solve the problems already experienced with PFI. One key part 
of this was the idea that LIFT would make NHS managers think more 
“entrepreneurially” and see themselves as part of “their” LIFT company. 
Unlike PFI, LIFT creates a public sector shareholding; 20% of the local LIFT 
company’s shares are held by local NHS organisations, which nominate a 
public sector representative to sit on the LIFT company board. Thus the LIFT 
structure has been designed not only to bring the private sector into NHS 
service planning, but also to embed shareholding logic within NHS managers’ 
decision-making. 
However, principles of “partnership” and “entrepreneurialism” herald 
renewed conflicts between accumulation and legitimacy. LIFT contracts place 
their holders in an extraordinarily favourable position. They do not merely 
concern one building or group of buildings, but give LIFT companies exclusive 
rights to develop any new primary care buildings in their area over the next 
twenty years. The model creates a new high-level Strategic Partnering Board 
to plan future service organisations in each LIFT area, dominated by senior 
private and public sector managers but excluding clinicians and patient 
representatives.8 The planners believed that this top-down structure would 
allow projects to proceed without delay; for example, they mistakenly thought 
that involving local authorities in LIFT would make the planning process a 
mere formality (Aldred 2007a). 
In national LIFT seminars, participants repeatedly referred to problems 
that had occurred when local people had objected to projects at the planning 
stage. As a LIFT-supporting consultant based in Wellston told me, the 
exclusion of local communities from LIFT structures was a false economy 
which often meant that 
 
a local residents group would put in a planning objection and that would have 
a financial impact on your scheme. It may delay it for eighteen months and 
nothing will happen at all. If you don’t get local goodwill then you’re not 
going to be able to develop the scheme perhaps at all. 
 
In Wellston, LIFT’s legitimacy had been dented among the NHS 
managers who were supposed to identify themselves with it. Most expressed 
concern over the slow pace of developments, and the additional work and 
costs involved. For example, NHS staff had been seconded to LIFT, although 
the NHS continued to pay at least some of their salaries, and one Trust was 
providing LIFT with apparently free office accommodation. Only one local 
NHS manager interviewed (out of ten) did not criticise LIFT during the 
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interview. This was the chief executive of the “lead PCT”, who had initially 
served on the LIFT company board. 
 Structures had been designed by high-level elites, without any input 
from the people who would have to implement and manage them (i.e., the 
managers), let alone from staff and service users. No one in Wellston seemed 
to feel that the governing Strategic Partnering Board was doing its job. A 
consortium of large companies based outside the area, the LIFT company 
seemed to lack the local knowledge necessary to find sites for development. 
Indeed, one GP surgery had been waiting three years for the LIFT company 
to identify a suitable new site. 
 This was corroborated by the comparator area in which LIFT appeared 
to be running most smoothly, although still not entirely without problems. A 
non-executive director there, generally critical of the LIFT concept from the 
viewpoint of a small businessman, felt his area’s choice of a local firm was 
crucial. He said: 
 
We’ve built up connections. And they’re nice people, and they genuinely want 
to do it in the right way for us, and to enhance their own reputation locally in 
doing that. But there are some LIFT companies elsewhere in the country 
where that doesn’t apply at all. We’re very grateful we haven’t got one of the 
national names that as you’re recording this I won’t mention. 
 
 However, his LIFT area was extremely unusual in having chosen a 
local firm, and he claimed that national policy-makers discouraged this, 
preferring local managers to choose “national names” (see 3.2 above). This 
reliance on large firms strained relationships with local “social enterprises” 
and small businesses in Wellston. Representatives of these organisations felt 
that they had not been included in the LIFT model, and that short-term 
financial gain was being prioritised over community regeneration. While LIFT 
enshrines the “local” in its title, local involvement is limited. Instead, as Harvey 
(2001:353) suggests, risk absorption is localised, as private capital and the 
national state attempt to devolve responsibility for service failure. 
 Thus while LIFT had been designed to foreground accumulation, and 
make the NHS and its local managers more geared to profitability, this 
strategy had run into problems. It generated legitimation problems owing to 
the policy’s perceived secrecy and impermeability to outsiders, with even local 
NHS managers tending to see themselves as outsiders. The process became 
bogged down and led to further delays and disengagement by all sides. To 
NHS managers the private sector seemed less interested in 
entrepreneurialising the “local health economy” than in securing long-term 
guaranteed revenue streams. 
Thus, steering problems (Habermas 1976) are likely to intensify. The 
long-term, complex contracts being negotiated by public authorities create 
unforeseen difficulties in responding to new demands from firms, service 
users, employees, and government. GPs and NHS managers will need to rely 
on complex procedures that they do not control, governed by contractual 
documentation and a powerful monopoly supplier. So while the public sector 
is exhorted to marketise itself, and services are re-conceptualised as 
commodities, a new monolith is being created, supported by complex and 
exclusive elite networks.  
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4. Resisting LIFT 
 
Yet popular legitimacy for this regime is far from assured. Rather than 
providing the promised “personalised services”, large companies and 
consortia seem more likely to favour simplicity and standardisation, 
guaranteeing them a smooth and reliable income stream. This squeezes out 
small companies, voluntary initiatives, and professionals, frustrating their 
hopes of autonomy and/or profit, threatening to deny privatisation initiatives 
the social support that they need to function. The different rules and privileges 
applying to favoured “corporate partners” create a particular image problem 
for the neo-liberal welfare state, and one which is at odds with entrepreneurial 
rhetoric. 
However, resistance is often patchy, localised, and defensive. In 
Wellston, local trade unionists felt exhausted by constant pressure from local 
management and government policies. One branch won a temporary victory: 
faced with the imminent privatisation of a primary care trust maintenance 
department, this local union had produced a dossier about the company to 
which employees would be outsourced. The firm has been the subject of 
allegations of racism in its management of prisons and detention centres. The 
primary care trust backed down faced with the threat of negative publicity; but 
as LIFT centres are built, maintenance will shift to the firm and employees will 
eventually be transferred to it piecemeal. 
There are tensions and ambiguities within professional attitudes to 
LIFT. Some Wellston GPs categorised themselves as politically progressive, 
and thus were critical of the running of GP surgeries as small businesses 
(even though they might be doing this themselves). These GPs tended to 
support the development of “one-stop shops” partly because of their 
perceived deprofessionalising effect. At the same time because GPs are 
organised as small businesses, they lacked the resources to effectively 
counter LIFT and were left fighting a rearguard action surgery-by-surgery. 
Indeed during the fieldwork year LIFT was not discussed as an agenda item 
at the national conference of Local Medical Committees. The left-wing 
Medical Practitioners’ Union (part of Amicus) did not take a clear position on 
LIFT; neither did the mainstream British Medical Association. While GPs and 
pharmacists are being squeezed out by LIFT’s corporatisation of welfare, their 
position tends to prevent them from taking a clear lead on resistance. 
The complexity of PPPs such as LIFT, and their often slow progress, 
means that explaining the issues in clear, simple language is vital, as people 
frequently feel confused and disempowered. However, the positive side is the 
potential for trade unions and service users to propose clear alternatives, in 
alliance with professionals, community organisations, and small businesses. 
Many of the latter are being excluded by the corporate re-alignment of welfare 
and so support (or be persuaded to support) principles of “public service” 
constructed in opposition to corporate profit. There is particularly strong 
potential for resistance to NHS reforms. Many service users believe that the 
NHS exemplifies an alternative “gift economy”, expressing public-ness as 
opposed to profit (Tudor Hart 2006). This is double-sided: as Doyal with 
Pennell (1994(1979)) argue, the belief that the NHS exists in a world of its 
own has silenced critique of ways that it has reproduced dominant value 
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systems. However, as the NHS is perceived to move ever further from an 
‘NHS ideal’, critique in the name of this ideal may represent a potent source of 
resistance. 
Research into PFI and LIFT has indicated contradictions inherent to 
this new ordering of welfare. PPP is expensive, putting increasing strain on 
the public purse.  Far from acting as a seamless network of customers and 
entrepreneurs, PPPs often have to be heavily steered from the top and this is 
certainly true in LIFT’s case. Researchers can usefully make this visible, as 
well as the existence and actions of the often hidden “double-hatters”. This 
can demystify, expose, and critique fissures between the market discourse 
justifying the policy and the experience of high costs, bureaucracy and 
corporate collusion. Otherwise, future neoliberal welfare is likely to mean a 
greater concentration of finance-led corporate power in alliance with the state, 
and the aggravation of systemic crises in service provision, which are likely to 
be blamed upon their victims. PPP scarcely represents a new stable 
settlement in which free trade achieves unproblematic hegemony, but rather a 
constant battle for power between capitals, labour forces and users (c.f. Peck 
and Tickell 1997).  
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1 Although PFI projects dominate other sectors in Wales, the Welsh Assembly has backed 
away from PFI hospitals while using PFI for smaller health-related schemes. 
2 In contrast, the Welsh Assembly has re-defined the clinical team to include support staff. 
3 In the NHS, primary care is now commissioned (and to some extent provided) by NHS 
primary care trusts, here sometimes referred to simply as primary care trusts or trusts. 
4 For further detail on methodology please see Aldred (2007). 
5 In September 2006 it was reported that the Department of Health would buy back 
Partnerships UK’s 50% share in Partnerships for Health. This has since happened. 
6 This may go further; particularly as fourth wave LIFT schemes explicitly include clinical 
services: GP partnerships may be replaced by private companies employing salaried doctors. 
7 While NHS Trusts are indeed minority shareholders in LIFT companies, LIFT is designed so 
that rents flow to holding companies within the LIFT structure, rather than the LIFT company 
itself. Indeed, many local managers interviewed saw little benefit from this shareholding. 
8 By contrast, existing Primary Care Trust structures pay at least lip service to the principle of 
“clinical governance”, and include patient representatives. 
